Exploring Jamal Murray’s Inconsistencies

Jamal Murray is coming off a historic run during last seasons NBA playoffs which featured him scoring 50 points twice and his Denver Nuggets taking down the highly anticipated Western Conference Champions, Los Angeles Clippers. Murray’s play was underscored even more given his unpredictable game to game performances during the regular season. I decided to search through Murray’s numbers to gain a better insight into his inconsistent play.

Murray’s basic stat line is deceiving on a cursory look. 18.5 points per game on 45.5% from the field and 35% from deep. But if one were to look at his game logs, namely, at his FG%, another picture comes to light.

Given the strangeness of Murray’s high variance FG%, the types of shots he took must have lead to this wildly inefficient game to game FG%.

This is Jamal Murray’s shot chart from the 2019–2020 season. What stuck out immediately was that he took more midrange jumpers than shots at the rim. Why? His expected value at the rim was significantly higher. An intuitive answer would lead one to think that since there was a center clogging the lane, getting to the rim was harder. But that answer doesn’t work here because Jokic is not a “traditional” center who plants himself in the paint. On the contrary! The lane should have been more open than usual.

The underlying question becomes, when Murray shot poorly, was he missing those midrange jump shots and/or was he not at the rim enough?

For comparison, I looked at Damian Lillard’s shot chart who has a similar usage rate and style of play. Maybe taking a lot of midrange jumpers isn’t as abnormal as I thought.

Lillard’s shot chart is much more efficient. More threes, more shots at the rim, and significantly less midrange jumpers. (Granted, Lillard attempted 5 more shots per game on average). Lillard had less variance in his game to game FG% compared to Murray and a F-test confirmed that the variances were statistically different.

Chris Paul and Kevin Durant, who take a high frequency of midrange jump shots like Murray, both shoot better than him in the long and short midrange per PBPStats.com. If one is going to take a high frequency of midrange jumpers, the respective FG% needs be upwards of 50% like Paul and Durant to make the shot “worth it.”

Less efficient does not necessarily equal more inconsistent. One could have a very high average with a high variance or a very low average with basically no variance. But that isn’t the case with Murray. He has a below league average FG% and eFG%. Per NBA.com, Murray is only shooting 41% on two point pull-ups (which is how many of his midrange shots are created) and is in the top 10 in the league for shots between 15–19 feet. His less efficient shots are intertwined in his variance and ultimately his inconsistent play.

Here is a chart that plots game-to-game FG% standard deviation against percentage of shots at the rim for 22 comparable players. Murray’s point is indicated by the arrow. There is a clear trend that for more shots at the rim, the lower the respective variance. Thus, if Murray were to attempt more shots at the rim and limit his midrange jumpers, one would expect his variance to shrink.

Yet, I needed to gain some more context into Murray’s shot selection.

The Nuggets run a good amount of pick and roll and dribble hand offs, mainly with Jokic and Murray. Often, Murray got a switch or “semi-switch” but he settled for a pull-up, step back, or running jump shot instead of going hard to the rim.

This play begins with a Jokic-Murray dribble hand off and Vucevic switches on to Murray. This scenario is exactly what Denver wants. But why doesn’t Murray attack Vucevic on the switch and go to the hoop? If Gordon helps, Milsap would be open for a dunk.

This play is a simple Jokic-Murray pick and roll. Saric hedges and Murray, seeing the entire right side of the floor open, wisely, rejects the screen and starts his drive to the basket. But instead of going hard to the rim, Murray steps back for a 15 foot jumper when he could have beaten Saric to the hoop.

There are times when a midrange jumper is a quality shot. The opposing team’s center will drop back on the pick and roll (in this case Meyers Leonard) and Murray will walk into an open jumper, but he will miss. Yet, this pick should come further away from the basket so he can walk into a three, not a long two (which we will see with Lillard).

Other times, teammates are open or will be open if he continues his drive to the basket instead of pulling up. We saw that in the Vucevic clip and here too.

This play starts as another Jokic-Murray pick and roll and Capela switches on to Murray. If Murray keeps his drive alive, Craig will be open for a corner three as Harden has shaded into the paint, Jokic (who is already open), will be under the basket for an easy layup and Grant will be open on the baseline as Tucker is already coming over to help.

On the other hand, Murray is not afraid to go to the rim on a switch or “semi-switch” which makes this overarching question more interesting.

Here, the Jokic-Murray pick and roll forces Baynes to switch on to Murray and Murray goes hard to the rim.

In this play, Murray breaks free with a pump fake and Towns switches on to Murray and Murray drives to the hoop.

In both of these plays, Murray could have pulled up or stepped back for a jumper but instead made the right play and drove to the hoop.

The film begs the question: How is Jokic effecting Murray’s shot selection?

Per nbashotcharts.com, Murray attempts more shots in the midrange when Jokic is off the floor. Since Jokic demands so much attention on the perimeter because of his elite playmaking ability, driving lanes are more open than when Mason Plumlee is playing center.

I watched some film of Lillard for comparison. The pick and roll is the bread and butter of the Blazers offense. A big difference I spotted is that the pick is set much higher for Lillard giving him more room to operate and make decisions.

Look how high the pick comes for Lillard. Jokic doesn’t want to come all the way up to contest given Lillard’s quickness and speed. But Jokic can’t let him walk into a three, which is exactly what happens.

Here, again, the pick is beyond the three point line. The defense blitzes the pick and roll but it’s not a problem for Lillard. He can blow by or split the defense with a clear path to rim and he doesn’t settle for a jump shot.

I watched 25 random pick and rolls for Murray and Lillard. The ball screen is regularly set for Lillard 3 to 5 feet behind the three point line whereas for Murray, it is usually set at the three point line or just beyond.

Why is Jokic (or Plumlee) setting screens for Murray at the three-point line? These screens should be set a few feet back thereby causing more pressure on the defense and giving Murray more room to operate and make decisions like the Blazers do with Lillard. Additionally, giving Jokic more room to roll to the hoop and allowing him to carve out the defense with his elite passing abilities is another added benefit. From watching the film, it appears that a lot of Murray’s midrange jumpers are “circumstantial.”

But even so, look at these two similar plays. Both start as a pick and roll. Lillard-Whiteside and Jokic-Murray. Jokic switches on to Lillard and Okafor swithces on to Murray. However, while Lillard chooses to go the rim, Murray settles for a fade-away.

It seems to be that when Murray shoots poorly, much can be explained from his midrange jump shots. If Murray attacks the rim more often, his game to game FG% and overall play would be more consistent. Additionally, those open midrange jump shots can transform into threes or open driving lanes to the rim if Jokic sets higher screens for Murray. Murray is a solid three point shooter where defenses would not welcome him stepping into an open three. It would be prudent for the Nuggets to take a closer look at Murray’s shot selection and the underlying causes behind them in order to optimize their chances at winning.